In the aftermath of the American-British coalition's quick and decisive victory in Iraq, French diplomats might be pondering the old adage Nothing fails like success.

Just a few weeks ago Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin was applauded at the United Nations Security Council and France's position was supported by huge crowds in the streets of Europe and around the world who rejected the prospect of war. Now a debate has started in France over the long-term validity of the French diplomatic option. Was it the right stand, the right style? Did France do too much to oppose an American policy that was irresistible and resulted in the fall of a tyrannical regime? If French objections had been listened to and followed, Saddam Hussein's regime would still be in place today.

The French diplomatic stance is based on a combination of principles, reflexes, calculations and apprehension. France took the moral high ground by speaking, rightly, in defense of international law and UN principles. And it was second nature for France to back the United Nations - the country's international identity is closely associated with its status as a permanent member of the Security Council.

It was legitimate for France to denounce the long-term risks for the international system of the new American doctrine of preventive warfare. If America, having defeated the Soviet empire of evil, starts describing itself as the empire of good, its responsible allies should voice their concerns. Lord Acton's formula, Power corrupts, absolute power corrupts absolutely, may very well summarize France's concern about the evolution of America's international role.

It was natural, too, for Paris to express such concerns given that in the last few decades to be French has meant to be interventionist in the world and at least slightly critical of the United States. And it was to be expected that President Jacques Chirac, the inheritor of the Gaullist tradition, would appear as the courageous leader of a coalition against the new hyperpower.

Beyond principles and reflexes, France's opposition to the American stance on Iraq was also based on a series of calculations. In the new Europe of 25, there is a clear majority of governments who support Washington but a clear majority of public opinion against America's choices. By siding with public opinion, France - the country of the French revolution - was addressing the peoples of Europe over the heads of their governments. As a result of its diplomatic stance, France has never been as popular in the Third World.

France was also motivated by apprehension, if not fear, for its own civil peace. With the largest Muslim community in the European Union - nearly 10 per cent of the French population - France was relieved that its diplomatic position protected it from violent outbursts in the French suburbs. France's Muslim community, whose integration is proving so difficult, felt represented by the French government. And happily for France, the war was short enough not to test the peaceful behavior of the community's most radical elements.

Yet on balance, there is a growing feeling in France that its diplomacy not only went too far in confronting America head on, but that if the French arguments were right, the French conclusions were wrong. France went too far in using the weapon of its veto at the Security Council. It also miscalculated in behaving toward America as if the Cold War - which united French and American interests against the Soviet Union - was not over and as if Sept. 11 had not constituted an emotional shock for the United States.

It is one thing to be in tune with the feelings of public opinion, but public opinion is fickle. And France cannot dream of building a Europe that can stand against the United States, even if it considers this a legitimate long-term goal. There is simply no majority in the new Europe of 25 for such a project, all the more so if it is led by a country that has deeply offended a significant segment of the new entrants by its severe declarations. Paris cannot at the same time isolate herself from the Anglo-Saxon and Central European worlds.

By offering unique political support, Britain has been exceptionally useful for the United States. By offering spectacular diplomatic resistance, France has represented a marginal nuisance value for the United States. The ultimate reward for Britain may be slim, but the cost for France, in political if not in economic terms, could be significant.

France has burned too many bridges. As it sets about rebuilding them, prudent, modest and - above all - quiet diplomacy is the order of the day.

The writer is a senior adviser at the French Institute of International Relations and a professor at the College of Europe.

Copyright © 2003 the International Herald Tribune

LONDON, England (CNN) -- A Baghdad boy band that rehearses in a battered Volkswagen could be launched into the big time after attracting the attention of a talent scout.

British promoter Peter Whitehead will help the band, "Unknown to No One," record an album after hearing one of their demo tracks on his Web site.

He will travel to Baghdad with a makeshift studio, make some recordings then hopefully get a deal from a record company.

The band, who have a western style and sing in English, were making music before the war, playing in their Passat car.

"This is the starting point for us. We will be sending in a production team to make a really good single," Whitehead told CNN.

He said the band's influences were western, although their music would probably have some Iraqi influences. "Some of their heroes include bands like Chicago which are in their parents' record collection."

The band registered their demo on Whitehead's Web site, BandRegister.com. "We were going to go into Baghdad even in the Saddam era."

Whitehead said the band was grateful coalition troops had gone into Iraq and had picked up on the message that there would be opportunities for young creative people...

© 2003 Cable News Network LP, LLLP.